

# DAILY NASHVILLE PATRIOT.

VOL. I.

NASHVILLE, TENN. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 1862

NEW SERIES—NO. 14

Steam Press Printing Concern!

## THE NASHVILLE PATRIOT

By the purchase of the printing establishment of the *New*, and recent additions of new materials from the *Western*, the *Journal* of the *Patriot* has been made the largest and most complete in the South-West. It is supplied with the most competent workmen, and has been applied to our process, which are of the best kind. We are prepared to print, in the highest style of the art, plates, in color, or bronze.

POSTERS, PROGRAMMES, SHOW CARDS, BILL HEADS, RAILROAD WORK, DRAY TICKETS, ETC.

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For all orders, at our office, No. 10 Deaderick street.

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GEN. G. P. SMITH, President Bank of Tennessee.

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Also to the following Wholesale Merchants in this city:

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March 17

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BEASLEY & RUTH,

No. 13, Deaderick street, Nashville, Tenn., near door to Henderson Bros.

ARE prepared to do all kinds of Painting, Graining, Marbling and Paper-Hanging, at prices to suit the times.

## Nashville Patriot.

### The Battles at Fort Donelson.

General Floyd's Report.

CAMP NEAR MOORESBORO, February 27, 1862.

GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON:

Sir: Your order of the 12th of this month, transmitted to me at Cumberland City, reached me the same evening. It directed me to repair at once, with what force I could command, to the support of the garrison at Fort Donelson. I immediately prepared for my departure, and effected it in time to reach Fort Donelson the next morning 13th, before daylight. Measures had been already taken by Brigadier-General Pillow, then in command, to render our resistance to the attack of the enemy as effective as possible. He had, with activity and industry, pushed forward the defensive works toward completion. These defenses consisted in an earthwork in Fort Donelson, in which were mounted guns of different caliber to the number of thirteen; a field work, intended to be supported by supports, and constructed immediately behind the battery and upon the summit of the hill in rear. Sweeping away from this field-work eastward, to the extent of nearly two miles in its windings, was a line of intrenchments, defended on the outside, at some points, with abatis. These intrenchments were occupied by the troops already there, and by the addition of those who came upon the field with me. The position of the fort, which was established by the Tennessee authorities, was by no means commanding, nor was the least military significance attached to the position. The intrenchments afterwards hastily made, in many places, were injudiciously constructed, because of the distance they were placed from the brow of the hill, subjecting the men to a heavy fire from the enemy's sharpshooters opposite, as they advanced to or retired from the entrenchments. Soon after my arrival the intrenchments were fully occupied from one end to the other, and just as the sun rose the cannonade from one of the enemy's gunboats announced the opening of the conflict which was destined to continue for three days and nights.

In a short time the fire became general along our whole line, and the enemy, who had already planted batteries at several points around the whole circuit of our entrenchments as shown by a diagram herewith sent, opened a general and active fire from all arms upon our trenches which continued until darkness put an end to the conflict. They charged with uncommon spirit at several points along the line, but most particularly at a point undefended by entrenchments down a hollow which separated the right wing under Brigadier-General Buckner from the right of the center commanded by Col. Heiman. This charge was prosecuted with uncommon vigor, but was met with a determined spirit of resistance, a cool, deliberate courage both by the troops of Brig.-Gen. Buckner and Col. Heiman, which drove the enemy, discomfited and cut to pieces, back upon the position he had assumed in the morning. Too high praise cannot be bestowed upon the battery of Capt. Porter for their participation in the rout of the enemy in this assault. My position was immediately in front of the point of attack, and I was thus enabled to witness more distinctly the incidents of it.

The enemy continued their fire upon different parts of our intrenchments throughout the night, which deprived our men of every opportunity to sleep. We lay that night upon our arms in the trenches. We confidently expected at the dawn of day a more vigorous attack than ever. But in this we were entirely mistaken. The day advanced, and no preparation seemed to be making for a general onset. But an extremely annoying fire was kept up from the enemy's sharpshooters throughout the whole line of the intrenchments, from their long range rifles. While this mode of attack was not attended with and considerable loss, it nevertheless confined the men to their usual rest. So stood the affairs of the field until three o'clock p. m. when the fleet of gunboats in full force advanced upon the fort and opened fire. They advanced in the shape of a crescent, and kept up a constant and incessant fire for one hour and a half which was replied to with uncommon spirit and vigor by the "fort." Once the boats reached a point within one hundred yards of the "fort" at which time it was that three of their boats sustained serious injuries from our batteries, and were compelled to fall back. The line was broken and the enemy discomfited on the water, giving up the fight entirely, which he never afterward renewed. I was satisfied from the incidents of the last two days that the enemy did not intend again to give us battle in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed, with very heavy slaughter, upon effort to storm our position; and it was fair to infer that they would not again renew the unavailing attempt at our dislodgment, when certain means to effect the same end without loss were perfectly at their command.

We were aware of the fact that ex-

remely heavy reinforcements had been continually arriving, day and night for three days and nights, and I had no doubt whatever that their whole available force on the western waters could and would be concentrated here if it was deemed necessary to reduce our position. I had already seen the impossibility of holding out any length of time with our inadequate number and indefensible position. There was no place within our intrenchments but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries. It was but fair to infer that, while they kept up a sufficient fire upon our intrenchments to keep our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on the right and on the left banks, and thus to cut off all our communications and to prevent the possibility of egress. I thus saw clearly that but one course was left by which a rational hope could be entertained of saving the garrison, or a part of it. That was to dislodge the enemy from his position on our left, and thus to pass our people into the open country, lying southward towards Nashville. I called for a committee of the officers of divisions and brigades, to take place after dark, when this plan was laid before them, approved and adopted, and at which it was determined to move from the trenches at an early hour on the next morning, and attack the enemy in his position.

It was agreed that the attack should commence upon our extreme left; and this duty was assigned Brigadier-General Pillow, assisted by Brigadier-General Johnson, having also under his command commanders of brigades, Colonel Baldwin, commanding Mississippi and Tennessee troops, and Colonel Wharton and Colonel Clausland, commanding Virginians. To Brigadier-General Buckner was assigned the duty of making the attack from near the center of our lines upon the enemy's forces upon the Wynn's Ferry road. The attack on the left was delayed longer than I expected, and consequently the enemy was found in position when our troops advanced. The attack, however, on our part was extremely spirited, and although the resistance of the enemy was obstinate, and their numbers far exceeded ours, our people succeeded in driving them discomfited and terribly cut to pieces from the entire left. The Kentucky troops, under Brigadier-General Buckner, advanced from their position behind the intrenchments upon the Wynn's Ferry road, but not until the enemy had been driven in a great measure from the position he occupied in the morning.

I had ordered on the night before the two regiments stationed in "Fort Donelson" to occupy the trenches vacated by Brigadier-General Buckner's forces, which, together with the men whom he marched to assist in this purpose, I thought sufficient to hold them.

My intention was to hold, with Brig.-Gen. Buckner's command, the Wynn's Ferry road, and thus to prevent the enemy, during the night, from occupying the position on our left, which he occupied in the morning. I gave him orders upon the field to that effect. Leaving him in position, I started for the right of our command to see that all was secure there, my intention being, if things could be held in the condition they then were, to move the whole army, if possible, to the open country lying southward beyond the Randolph Forges. During my absence, and from some misapprehension, I presume, of the previous order given, Brig.-Gen. Pillow ordered Brig.-Gen. Buckner to leave his position on the Wynn's Ferry road and to resume his place in his trenches on the right. This movement was nearly executed before I was aware of it. As the enemy were pressing upon the trenches, I deemed that the execution of this last order was all that was left to be done. The enemy, in fact, succeeded in occupying an angle of the trenches on the extreme right of Brig.-Gen. Buckner's command; and as the fresh forces of the enemy had begun already to move toward our left to occupy the position they held in the morning, and as we had no force adequate to oppose their progress, we had to submit to the mortification of seeing the ground which we had won by such a severe conflict in the morning occupied by the enemy before midnight. The enemy had been landing reinforcements throughout the day. His numbers had been augmented to eighty-three regiments.

Our troops were completely exhausted by four days and nights of continued conflict. To renew it with any hope of successful result was obviously vain, and such I understood to be the unanimous opinion of all the officers present at the council called to consider what was best to be done. I thought, and so announced, that a desperate onset on the right of the enemy's forces on the ground where we had attacked them in the morning might result in the extrication of a considerable proportion of the command from the position we were in, and this opinion I understood to be concurred in by all who were present. But it was likewise agreed, with the same unanimity, that it would result in the slaughter of nearly all who did not succeed in effecting their escape. The question then arose whether, in point of humanity and a sound military policy,

a course should be adopted from which the probabilities were that the larger portion of the command would be cut to pieces in an unavailing fight against overwhelming numbers. I understood the general sentiment to be adverse to the proposition. I felt that in this contingency, whilst it might be questioned, whether I should, as commander of the army, lead it to certain destruction in an unavailing fight, yet I had a right individually to determine that I would not survive a surrender there. To satisfy both propositions, I agreed to hand over the command to Brigadier-General Buckner, through Brigadier-General Pillow, and to make an effort for my own extrication by any and every means that might present themselves to me.

I therefore directed Col. Forrest, a daring and determined officer, at the head of an efficient regiment of cavalry, to be present for the purpose of accompanying me in what I supposed would be an effort to pass through the enemy's lines. I announced the fact upon turning the command over to Brigadier-General Buckner, that I would bring away with me, by any means I could, my own particular brigade, the property of which was acquiesced in on all hands. This, by various means, I succeeded in accomplishing to a great extent, and would have brought off my whole command in one way or another if I had had the assistance of field officers, who were absent from several of the regiments. The command was turned over to Brigadier-General Buckner, who at once opened negotiations with the enemy, which resulted in the surrender of the place. Thus ended the conflict running through four days and four nights; a large portion of which time it was maintained with the greatest fierceness and obstinacy; in which we, with a force not exceeding 13,000, a large portion of whom were ill armed, succeeded in resisting and driving back, with discomfiture, an army of more than 80,000 men. I have no means of accurately estimating the loss of the enemy. From what I saw upon the battle-field; from what I witnessed throughout the whole period of the conflict; from what I was able to learn from sources of information deemed by me worthy of credit, I have no doubt that the enemy's loss in killed and wounded reached a number beyond five thousand.

Our own losses were extremely heavy, but I want of exact returns I am unable to state precise numbers. I think they will not be far from 13,000 killed and wounded. Nothing could exceed the coolness and determined spirit of resistance which animated the men in this long and ferocious conflict; nothing could exceed the determined courage which characterized them throughout this terrible struggle, and nothing could be more admirable than the steadiness which they exhibited, nature itself was exhausted in what they knew to be a desperate fight against a foe very many times their superior in numbers. I cannot particularize in this report to you the numberless instances of heroic daring performed by both officers and men, but must content myself for the present by saying, in my judgment, they all deserve well of their country.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
[Signed] JOHN B. FLOYD,  
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

### The Confederate Congress.

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE DISASTERS IN TENNESSEE.

In the Rebel House of Representatives, on March 10, Mr. Currin, of Tennessee, offered a resolution touching the management of the Quartermaster's Department in the State of Tennessee, and especially with regard to the recent disaster to our arms at Fort Donelson and elsewhere; and more particularly with reference to the action of the Quartermaster, Major V. K. Stevenson, of that service, before the surrender of the city of Nashville; and also with reference to the quantity of stores—provisions, munitions of war, and hospital stores—which were lost to the Government at that place.

A long debate followed, in the course of which Mr. Atkins, of Tennessee, said that while investigations were being made, they should also be made into the conduct of General Johnston. General Johnston had command of the entire army of the West until General Beauregard was sent to Columbus. He knew that the Cumberland river, when swollen, would afford entrance into every part of Tennessee. He knew that the Tennessee river, at high tide, would conduct the enemy's vessels into the very heart of the Southern Confederacy. He knew that it would let the enemy on his rear. But General Johnston had but one idea—a single idea—to make a stand at Bowling Green. It was his great idea. Now he would not impeach the patriotism and chivalry of General Albert Sidney Johnston, but it would be well enough if we took pattern from Lincoln's Government, and whenever a General lost a battle remove him, unless there was some sufficiently strong reason and justifiable cause for the failure.

When Gen. Johnston fell back from Bowling Green he had between ten and fifteen thousand troops. Before he had entered Nashville he had determined to surrender it; before he had reached the confines of that proud city of Tennessee

—the capital of a State whose citizens never turned their back upon the foe. During the three days of the struggle at Fort Donelson, when men stood a foot deep in blood and snow, the citizens of Tennessee showed as much gallantry as any State in the Confederacy. Gen. Johnston had been desired to make a stand at Nashville, but he declined doing it. The speaker had heard that the President had a very high opinion of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston. If such was the case, he was sorry to differ with him. The people, the army under Gen. Johnston's command, and the people of Tennessee, had lost confidence in the military capacity of Gen. Johnston.

Mr. Moore, of Kentucky, defended General Johnston. He wished to give a wide scope to investigation. It was only until of late that Gen. Johnston had as many as twenty-five thousand efficient men in the field. He was asked for no reinforcements during the battle at Fort Donelson. He could not reinforce that point, for on the instant that he moved his army from the point at which he was stationed, the large force of the enemy, amounting to one hundred thousand men, would have marched on Nashville, and thus the whole army, instead of a portion of it, would have been captured, and Gen. Johnston would now have been where the gallant Gen. Buckner is, in exile. Gen. Johnston had no power to prevent the passage of gunboats up the Tennessee river. Five steamers were lying off Nashville, and had been for six months past, and the most that he knew to work on them all at one time was five men. He (the speaker) wanted the blame to fall where it properly belongs. What would have been the consequence of making a stand at Nashville? That beautiful city, instead of now standing, and in a condition still to be the pride of the South if she is retaken, would, in all probability, have been in ashes. Why did not the people of Nashville themselves fortify the city?

Mr. Foote said that Gen. Johnston had called for 1,000 or 1,500 slaves to work on the fortifications, and that the call had been fully answered when Nashville was surrendered. Gen. Johnston had been importuned time and time again to fortify Nashville, but he had failed to do it. The people of Nashville had surrendered every arm that they had—shot-guns and everything else of that sort; those that were there had nothing to fight with. He understood that some vile slanderer had called them cowards, and had asked why did not the women and children go out and fight the foe? When the armed soldiery was flying fast, when Generals Pillow and Floyd would not remain in it, when armed forces considered it impolitic and unsafe, some one asks the question why did not the women and children fight? It was the most contemptible and foul slander that ever appeared in the columns of a newspaper, in the city of Richmond or elsewhere, and the man who perpetrated it was worthy of a place upon the scaffold.

Mr. Moore said that the gentleman evidently had no reference to his speech. The resolution was passed—yeas, 52; nays, 23.

### The Prospect of Trade with the Occupied Portion of Tennessee.

NASHVILLE, Tenn., March 11, 1862.

EDS. COM.—Knowing the great interest of the wholesale merchants of your city in the reopening of the Southern trade, I have taken special pains to inform myself as to the probability of a speedy resumption of lucrative commercial relations with the portion of Tennessee now under the control of the Federal Government. That the anxiety of your business men in reference to this subject is vivid, may well be supposed, and that the more sanguine among them have entertained high expectations since the occupation of this city by the Federal troops, I infer from your commercial columns. I would feel much gratified by being able to announce, that Northern trade can safely, immediately, and profitably follow in the wake of the Northern army to this section of the country. But the result of my investigations does not warrant me in giving expression to any such opinion. I hold, on the contrary, in view of what I have seen and learned during the last two weeks, that the prospect of successful mercantile ventures in this direction is rather faint, and this because—

1. The only means of buying at the command of the tradesmen and people of this vicinity are Southern funds.

2. The quantity of cotton, tobacco, grain, and such other produce as might afford a basis for an exchange trade, on store in this city, is very small.

3. The mass of the agricultural population within the Federal lines is frightened and unfriendly, and will not bring their productions into market until necessity compels them to do so, which will not be the case for some time.

In regard to reason first, it is evident, in the face of the war, and the incidental uncertainty of the fate of most Southern Banks, that an exchange of Northern goods for Southern money is the only means of buying, as stated, of the tradesmen and people at large, hereabouts—would involve a risk that no prudent

shipper would wish to run. Even if the high prices that prevailed here during the last six months should be readily realized, the heavy rates of discount to which Southern currency is subject in the North, would render profits more than questionable. The ruthlessness of the leaders of the rebellion, in this and other States, makes it very probable that many banks will go down with the rebel cause. The books and funds of banks in this city, as well as in most towns of the Southern part of Middle Tennessee, have been carried off, and the same is likely to be done in Alabama, Mississippi, etc., as our troops will advance. It is probable that the rebel leaders, whose violence will grow more desperate and unsparring, in proportion to the lessening of their chances of success, will allow them to be returned to the institutions in question.

As to the second reason, it will be remembered that the accumulation of cotton was prevented by the rebel authorities. The blockade caused the dealers in tobacco to abstain from buying more than local consumption required. Other farming produce was brought up for, and consumed by, the rebel armies.

It may be that it will not be long before the farmers of this neighborhood will come to their senses, and bring their surplus productions into market. But present appearances indicate that they will not do this, until they are fully satisfied of the certainty of the ultimate overthrow of the Confederate Government.

For the above reasons, I am persuaded that Northern merchants will not lose anything by not being too hasty in sending goods on speculation to this place. Things may possibly change sooner to the better than I expect. As matters are situated now, however, the safest course for them will undoubtedly be to wait for the appearance of Nashville merchants with specie or bankable funds in Cincinnati.

### Hayard Taylor Visits Centerville and Manassas—What he has to say.

(From Hayard Taylor's Letters to the N. Y. Tribune.)

I am not a military man, you know. I could be easily puzzled by a dexterous use of the technology of a staff officer. I hear, on good authority, that several officers of high rank have declared to-day: "The fortifications at Centerville are perfectly impregnable." Impregnable? Good God! What a temptation! I must entertain of our gallant soldiery! I have seen Cerro Gordo; the position at Centerville is not so strong—yet we took Cerro Gordo. I have seen Chapultepec; it is five times as formidable—yet we took it. I have seen Narva; the hill is twice as steep, and twice as high—yet 8,000 Swedes, rushing up it, drove 50,000 Russians, under Peter the Great, from their intrenchments. This is supposing, of course, that we should be so obliging as to attack the Rebels just where they could most easily defend, omitting the opportunities of turning their position. But it is useless to talk; I am a civilian. We have escaped a terrible danger, and gained a great and "a bloodless victory."

I do not wish to be misunderstood as blaming any individual. I was most favorably impressed, last fall with the bearing of Gen. McClellan, and with his evident success in resolving order out of chaos. I have deprecated the popular impatience with the inaction of the army of the Potomac during the winter, and insisted that the organizing power which had moulded a demoralized military mob into obedient capacity for action should be allowed to develop its plan in its own good time, without interference. It is for those in authority to judge where the blame lies. But, using my eyes and my ears—employing (modestly speaking) average powers of deduction—I cannot escape the following deductions: First—That the topographical character of the position at Manassas has been wholly misunderstood. Instead of a high plain, with descending terraces, furnishing concentric lines of defense, it is a low plain, of which the only natural advantage is the stream of Bull Run, with a low bluff bank.

Second—That the position at Centerville, though naturally formidable to an advance from Fairfax, has no flank or rear defenses, is imperfectly fortified, and, from all indications, never had any siege guns.

Third—That the three or four small forts near Manassas Junction, on an open plain, do not constitute a strategic position of any importance.

Fourth—That the strongest of the rebel works was inferior, both in construction and armament, to the weakest of our forts on the Virginia side of Washington.

Fifth—That the rebels never had, at any one time, in all the camps between Centerville and Manassas, more than 75,000 men.

Sixth—That an advance of our whole army, made any time since the 1st of November last, would very likely have reached Manassas with as much expedition and as little loss as the advance at this time. It is scarcely likely that the rebels, who have been all along so well informed as to our strength and our contemplated movements, would have hazarded an engagement which must have resulted disastrously to them.

